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The CIIF, International Center for Financial Research, is an interdisciplinary center with an 
international outlook and a focus on teaching and research in finance. It was created at the 
beginning of 1992 to channel the financial research interests of a multidisciplinary group of 
professors at IESE Business School and has established itself as a nucleus of study within the 
School’s activities. 
Ten years on, our chief objectives remain the same: 
•  Find answers to the questions that confront the owners and managers of finance 
companies and the financial directors of all kinds of companies in the performance of 
their duties 
•  Develop new tools for financial management 
•  Study in depth the changes that occur in the market and their effects on the financial 
dimension of business activity 
All of these activities are programmed and carried out with the support of our sponsoring 
companies. Apart from providing vital financial assistance, our sponsors also help to define 
the Center’s research projects, ensuring their practical relevance. 
The companies in question, to which we reiterate our thanks, are: 
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The market risk premium is one of the most important but elusive parameters in 
finance. It is also called equity premium, market premium and risk premium. The term 
“market risk premium” is difficult to understand because it is used to designate three different 
concepts: 
1.  Required market risk premium. It is the incremental return of a diversified 
portfolio (the market) over the risk-free rate (return of treasury bonds) required 
by an investor. It is needed for calculating the required return to equity (cost of 
equity). 
 
2.  Historical market risk premium. It is the historical differential return of the 
stock market over treasury bonds.  
 
3.  Expected market risk premium. It is the expected differential return of the stock 
market over treasury bonds.  
 
Many authors and finance practitioners assume that expected market risk premium 
is equal to the historical market risk premium and to the required market risk premium. 
The CAPM assumes that the required market risk premium is equal to the expected market 
risk premium. 
The three concepts are different. The historical market risk premium is equal for all 
investors, but the required and the expected market risk premium are different for different 
investors. We also claim that there is no required market risk premium for the market as a 
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MARKET RISK PREMIUM: 





The market risk premium is one of the most important but elusive parameters in 
finance. It is also called equity premium, market premium and risk premium.  
The term “market risk premium” is difficult to understand because it is used to 
designate three different concepts: 
1.  The incremental return of a diversified portfolio (the market) over the risk-free rate 
(return of treasury bonds) required by an investor. This concept is the required market 
risk premium. It is needed for calculating the required return to equity (cost of equity).  
2.  The historical differential return of the stock market over treasury bonds. This is a piece 
of historical information that may or may not be of interest. This concept is the 
“historical market risk premium”. 
3.  The expected differential return of the stock market over treasury bonds. This concept is 
the “expected market risk premium”. Many authors and finance practitioners assume that 
this expectation is equal to the historical market risk premium and to the required market 
risk premium. The CAPM assumes that the required market risk premium is equal to the 
expected market risk premium. 
In this paper, we show that these three concepts are different. The historical market 
risk premium is equal for all investors, but the required and the expected market risk 
premium are different for different investors. We also claim that there is no required market 
risk premium for the market as a whole: different investors use different required market risk 
premiums. 
 
The required market risk premium is one thing, 
the historical differential return of the stock market over treasury bonds  (historical market risk 
premium) is another, 
and the expected market risk premium, another. 
It is a common mistake to confuse them. 
 
For an investor, the required market risk premium is the answer to the following 
question: What incremental return do I require to a diversified portfolio of shares (a stock 
index, for example) over the risk-free rate? It is a crucial parameter for any company because 
the answer to the above question is the key to determining the company’s required return to 
equity (Ke) and indeed the required return to any investment project. 2 
As we will see below, there are two difficulties in determining the required market 
risk premium: the first and most important is that it is not the same for all investors
1; the 
second is that it is not an observable quantity. We shall see that the required market risk 
premium is not, as is often claimed, the historic return of the market portfolio over the risk-
free rate (historical market risk premium). 
The expected market risk premium is the answer to a question we would all like to 
be able to answer accurately, namely: What incremental return do I expect from the market 
portfolio over the risk-free rate over the next few years? If RF is the risk-free rate of 
government securities, and E(RM) is the expected return of the market, then 
 
Expected market risk premium = [E(RM) - RF] 
 
Example. There are four investors. All four must agree on the historical market risk premium, assuming they 
use the same stock index, the same calculation period, the same way of calculating the mean (arithmetic or 
geometric) and the same risk-free rate. In the table below, 5.6% is the geometric average of the historical market 
risk premium of the S&P 500 versus 30-year U.S. bonds in the period 1926-2003 (see Table 5). The difference 
between investor A and investor B lies in their expected market risk premium. Investor A would (and investor B 
would not) invest in a diversified stock portfolio because its expected market risk premium is higher (lower) 
than his required market risk premium. Investor C would not invest either, because his required return to shares 
is much higher than his expected return. Investor D is the one we find in a lot of textbooks: his required market 
risk premium and his expected market risk premium are equal to the historical market risk premium (5.6%). 
Investor D is indifferent between investing in the market portfolio or not. 
 
  Four different investors 
 A  B  C  D 
Required market risk premium  4.0% 4.0%  8.0% 5.6% 
Historical market risk premium  5.6%  5.6%  5.6%  5.6% 
Expected market risk premium for the next 3 years  5.6%  2.0%  4.0%  5.6% 
 
The expected market return is the most important parameter in finance, but it is an expectation and, 
therefore, a non-observable parameter. Here’s an anecdote from Nobel prizewinner Merton Miller: “I still 
remember the teasing we financial economists, Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe, and I, had to put up with 
from the physicists and chemists in Stockholm when we conceded that the basic unit of our research, the 
expected rate of return, was not actually observable. I tried to tease back by reminding them of their neutrino –a 
particle with no mass whose presence was inferred only as a missing residual from the interactions of other 
particles. But that was eight years ago. In the meantime, the neutrino has been detected”.
2 
CAPM. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) defines the required return to equity in the following terms: 
Ke = RF + ß [E(RM) – RF] 
RF = rate of return for risk-free investments (Treasury bonds).  ß = share’s beta.   
 E(RM)  = expected market return. [E(RM) – RF] = expected market risk premium. 
                                                            
1 There is a required market risk premium for each investor, but we cannot talk about a required market risk 
premium for the whole market. The existence of a required market risk premium for the whole market implies 
that all investors have the same required market risk premium. 
2 See Merton Miller (2000), p. 3. 3 
Therefore, given certain values for the equity’s beta, the risk-free rate and the expected market risk 
premium, it is possible to calculate the required return to equity
3.
 Note that the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
assumes that the required market risk premium is equal to the expected market risk premium. 
In addition to the beta, in order to calculate the required return to equity (as postulated by the 
CAPM), we need to know the value of the market risk premium. The market risk premium is the difference 
between the expected return on the market portfolio and the risk-free rate, that is, the incremental return 
demanded by investors on stocks, above that of risk-free investments. 
The market value of the company’s equity is obtained by discounting the equity cash flow at the 
required return to equity for the company (Ke). 
 
The expected market risk premium is an expectation and not the market’s historical 
return above the risk-free rate, as is often stated. 
 
1. Methods proposed for calculating the required market risk premium 
 
1.1.   Historical differential return of the market portfolio and the risk-free rate (historical 
market risk premium) 
It is very common to use historical data to compare the return of an investment in 
shares with the return of the risk-free rate. Some conclude that the difference between the 
historical return of the stock market (of a stock market index) and the historical return of the 
risk-free rate
4 is a good indicator of the market premium. In support of this statement, it is 
often argued that, on average, the market is right. Thus, although the equity gain above bonds 
in a particular year is not considered to be the market risk premium, the incremental return of 
stocks over bonds over a number of years is considered to be a good estimator of the required 
market risk premium. Another of the contradictions of this approach is that after a very good 
year for the stock market, the required market risk premium will have risen and, after a bad 
year, the market risk premium will have fallen, even if there is no reason for this. This means 
that, given equal expectations, the market will value a share higher after a bad year than after 
a good year (after a good year, the risk premium would be greater). 
This method, sometimes called Ibbotson’s method, assumes that the required return 
to equity in the past was equal to the return actually received, and that the market is all 
investors’ efficient portfolio. As we will see further on, this method provides inconsistent 
results and, at present, exaggerates the required market risk premium. 
However, many authors and textbooks suggest using this method to calculate the 
required market risk premium. Ibbotson and Chen (2003) use 1926-2000 historical equity 
returns and conclude that the long-term equity risk premium (relative to the long-term 
government bond yield) is estimated to be about 5.9% arithmetically, and 3.97% 
geometrically.  
Brealey and Myers suggested 8.2-8.5% in the fifth edition of their book in 1996; on 
page 160 of their sixth edition (2000), they say: 
                                                            
3 The classic finance textbooks provide a full discussion of the concepts analyzed here. For example, Brealey & 
Myers (2000), and Copeland & Weston (1988). 
4 As we will see further on, the difference can be calculated as an arithmetic average or geometric average. For 
the historical return of the risk-free rate, long-term or short-term bonds can be used. Furthermore, there are 
authors who use the return of the risk-free rate (the return gained from buying bonds today and selling them in 
the next period), and others use the IRR of the risk-free rate at the beginning of the period. In the following 
sections, we will analyze which of these alternatives is the most suitable. 4 
 “Brealey and Myers have no official position on the exact market risk premium, but we believe a 
range of 6 to 8.5 percent is reasonable for the United States. We are most comfortable with figures toward 
the upper end of the range”.  
Further on, on page 195, they say:  
 “How about the market risk premium? From past evidence it appears to be 8 to 9 percent, although 
many economists and financial managers would forecast a lower figure”.  
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000, page 221) recommend 4.5-5% (in the second 
edition of 1995, they recommend 5-6%); Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1993) recommend 
8.5%; Van Horne (1992) recommends 3-7%; Weston, Chung and Siu (1997) recommend 
7.5%; and Damodaran (1994, pages 22-24) recommends 5.5%
5. In the examples given in 
their book, Bodie and Merton (2000) use 8% for USA. Damodaran (2001, page 63) 
recommends: 
 “6.05%, which is the geometric average premium for stocks over treasury bonds from 1928 to 1999 
if you use historical premiums. In using this premium, however, you are assuming that there are no trends 
in the risk premium and that investors today demand premiums similar to those they used to demand two, 
four, or six decades ago. Given the changes that have occurred in the markets and in the investor base over 
the last century, you should have serious concerns about using this premium, especially in the context of 
valuation.”  
I completely agree with Damodaran on that point. 
The argument used by Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000, page 221) is surprising:  
 “It is unlikely that the U.S. Market index will do as well over the next century as it has in the past, 
so we adjust downward the historical arithmetic average market risk premium. If we substract a 1.5 to 2 
percent survivorship bias from the long-term arithmetic average of 6.5 percent
6, we conclude that the 
market risk premium should be in the 4.5 percent to 5 percent range”.  
Further on, they acknowledge that, at the beginning of the year 2000, most 
investment banks used a risk premium between 3.5 and 5%. However, in 1995, in the second 
edition, they said (see page 268):  
 “We recommend using a 5 to 6 percent market risk premium for U.S. companies. This is based on 
the long-run geometric average risk premium for the return of the S&P 500 versus the return on long-term 
government bonds from 1926 to1992… we use a geometric average of rates of return because arithmetic 
averages are biased by the measurement period”.  
In the first edition (1990), they said (see page 196):  
 “Our opinion is that the best forecast of the risk premium is its long-run geometric average”.  
Obviously, in the third edition, they changed their criterion.   
Mayfield (2004) performs an analytically more complex estimate of the risk 
premium and concludes that the required market risk premium for the period after 1940 is 
5.9% over the yield on Treasury bills.  
Claus and Thomas (2001) argue that the required risk premium is 3% less than the 
historical market risk premium, and they recommend using a U.S. market risk premium 
between 3 and 4%. 
                                                            
5 Damodaran (1994, Table 3.1, page 22) calculates the geometric average differential return (T-bonds) for the 
period 1926-1990 and finds 5.5%: this is the US market risk premium that he uses throughout his book. 
6 This is the arithmetic mean of 2-year returns from 1926 to 1998. The arithmetic mean of 1-year returns is 7.5 
percent. 5 
Harris and Marston (1999) use expectations of financial analysts to estimate a 
market risk premium for U.S. stocks. Using the S&P 500 as a proxy for the market portfolio, 
they find an average market risk premium of 7.14% above yields on long-term U.S. 
government bonds over the period 1982-1998. They also claim that the market risk premium 
appears to move inversely with government interest rates. 
The advisability of adjusting for survivorship bias is not clear.  We agree with 
Siegel (1999, p. 13) that,  
“Although stock returns may be lower in foreign countries than in the U.S., the real returns on 
foreign bonds are substantially lower. Almost all disrupted markets experienced severe inflation, in some 
instances wiping out the value of fixed-income assets. (One could say that the equity premium in Germany 
covering any period including the 1922-1923 hyperinflation is over 100%, since the real value of fixed-
income assets fell to zero while equities did not.)”  
The expected market risk premium (an expectation) is one parameter; the historical 
differential return of stocks over treasury bonds (historical market risk premium) is another. 
It is a common mistake to think that they are equal. 
Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003) examine equity, bond, and bill returns in 16 
different countries over the 103-year period from 1900 to 2002 (see Table 1). They conclude 
that the expected geometric market risk premium for the world’s major markets should be 3% 
(5% arithmetic), substantially lower than appears in textbooks, than emerges from 
management surveys, or than the average found in their own study. They also argue that even 
this lower figure for the historical risk premium is still an overestimate of the likely future 
risk premium. 
Table 1. Historical differential return of the stock market over fixed income in the short (30 days) and 
long term (10 or 30 years) in 16 countries for the period 1900-2002. Annualized returns. 
  Over short term risk-free rate  Over long term risk-free rate 
  Geometric Arithmetic  Standard  Geometric Arithmetic  Standard 
  average average deviation average average deviation 
Australia 6.8%  8.3%  17.2%  6.0%  7.6% 19.0% 
Germany 3.9%  9.4%  35.5%  5.7%  9.0% 28.8% 
Japan 6.1%  9.3%  28.0%  5.4%  9.5% 33.3% 
South Africa  5.9%  7.9%  22.2%  5.2%  6.8% 19.4% 
Sweden 5.2%  7.5%  22.2%  4.8%  7.2% 22.5% 
USA 5.3%  7.2%  19.8%  4.4%  6.4% 20.3% 
Italy 6.3%  10.3%  32.5%  4.1%  7.6% 30.2% 
Canada 4.2%  5.5%  16.8%  4.0%  5.5% 18.2% 
Holland 4.3%  6.4%  22.6%  3.8%  5.9% 21.9% 
UK 4.2%  5.9%  20.1%  3.8%  5.1% 17.0% 
France 6.4%  8.9%  24.0%  3.6%  5.8% 22.1% 
Ireland 3.6%  5.5%  20.4%  3.2%  4.8% 18.5% 
Belgium 2.2%  4.4%  23.1%  2.1%  3.9% 20.2% 
Spain 2.8%  4.9%  21.5%  1.9%  3.8% 20.3% 
Denmark 2.2%  3.8%  19.6%  1.5%  2.7% 16.0% 
Switzerland 3.2%  4.8%  18.8%  1.4%  2.9% 17.5% 
Average 4.5%  6.9%  22.8%  3.8%  5.9% 21.6% 
World 4.4%  5.7%  16.5%  3.8%  4.9% 15.0% 
Source: Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003) 
 The figure for the World is the weighted average (using GDP). 6 
1.2. Using the Gordon and Shapiro formula 
Other authors propose calculating the market risk premium from the Gordon and 
Shapiro equation, which determines the share price by discounting the dividends when the 
latter grow at an annual rate g each year: P0 = EPS1 / (Ke –g)  
Isolating Ke in the formula, we get: Ke = (EPS1/P0) + g  
The argument put forward by advocates of this method is the following: Ke is the 
return required of the market (a diversified portfolio), and must match the return expected by 
“the market”:  Ke = E(RM)  = RF + PM 
Consequently, PM = (EPS1/P0) + g - RF 
Applying the latter expression to the market as a whole, (EPS1/P0) is the average 
dividend-based market return, g is the growth of dividends expected by “the market”, and RF 
is the risk-free rate. To calculate the market risk premium, all we have to do is estimate the 
dividend growth expected by “the market”. 
Note that for these calculations to make any sense we need to assume that the price 
of the shares coincides with their value, and that dividend growth is as expected by “the 
market”. 
The problem with this method is, once again, that investors’ expectations are not 
homogenous. If they were, it would make sense to talk in terms of a market risk premium, as 
all investors would have the market portfolio and the same expectations regarding the 
portfolio
7. However, as expectations are not homogenous, it is obvious that investors who 
expect higher growth will have a higher market risk premium. On the other hand, not all 
investors expect dividends to grow geometrically at a constant rate. 
Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Shcherbina (2001) calculate the equity premium using 
a variation of a formula in the classic Gordon stock valuation model. The calculation includes 
the bond yield, the stock dividend yield, and the expected dividend growth rate, which in this 
formulation can change over time. They conclude that the U.S. equity premium has declined 
significantly over the last three decades: The premium averaged 7% during 1926-70 and only 
0.7% after that.  
1.3. Survey of analysts and investors 
Perhaps the most direct way to calculate the market risk premium is to carry out a 
survey of analysts or investors. 
One example of this method is Welch’s study (2000). Welch performed two surveys, 
in 1997 and 1998, with several finance professors, asking them what they thought the market 
risk premium was. He obtained 226 replies and the average market risk premium (arithmetic) 
was 7% above long-term Treasury bonds (5.2% when measured as a geometric average).
8  
                                                            
7 Even then, this method requires knowing the expected growth of dividends. A higher growth estimate implies 
a higher premium. 
8 Surprisingly, this figure is very high. The interest rate paid by long-term Treasury bonds in April 1998 was 
approximately 6%. The inflation rate expected by most banks and companies specializing in making forecasts 
was less than 2.5%. Consequently, the actual expected return of long-term Treasury bonds was 3.5%. A market 
risk premium of 6% implies an actual expected stock return of 9.5%. At that time, the forecasts of the real 
growth of the gross national product were running at about 2.5%. As the dividends paid by American companies 
were less than 3% of the shares’ price, the forecast annual increase in the companies’ equity market value would 
be 1.095 divided by 1.03 - 1 = 6.3%. This means that companies’ real equity market value will grow much more 
than the gross national product. According to these forecasts, in 2048, the stock return would be equal to or 
greater than the US gross national product. This extrapolation is impossible; it is unfeasible that the annual stock 
return could ever be greater than the US gross national product. 7 
Welch (2001) presents the results of a survey of 510 finance and economics 
professors performed in August 2001. The consensus forecast for the 30-year equity premium 
was 5.5% (arithmetic) and 4.7% (geometric). The consensus 30-year stock market average 
return forecast was 9.1%. These forecasts are lower than those made just 3 years earlier. 
The magazine Pensions and Investments (12/1/1998) carried out a survey among 
professionals working for institutional investors and the mean market risk premium obtained 
was 3%. In another survey of pension fund professionals (1997, Greenwich Associates 
Survey), the mean market risk premium obtained was 5%. 
 
1.4. From the inverse of the PER 
The proponents of this method start with the formula that relates price (P) to book 
value (Ebv):              
P/Ebv = (ROE – g)/(Ke – g). 
If it is assumed that g=0, then Ke = ROE x Ebv/E = PAT/E = 1/PER. If we believe 
this assumption of g=0, then: risk premium = (1/PER) - RF. Applying this to the U.S. market 
in July 2001, when the PER of the S&P 500 was 26.2 and RF was 5.04%, this gives a 
negative market risk premium (-1.2%), which is absurd. 
 
1.5. As the difference between stock and long-term bond volatilities  
This method also often gives absurd results. Reilly, Wright and Chan (2000) show 
that, in the period 1950-1999, the annualized average bond volatility was 4.9% and the 
annualized average stock volatility was 14.1%. The difference is 9.2%, which is too high for 
the equity risk premium in the US. 
As further evidence, the difference of volatilities in Spain between the IBEX 35 
index and 10-year bonds oscillated between 6% and 32% over the period 1992-2003. 
 
1.6. More recent studies 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) find that  
 “the estimated equity premium since 1834 fluctuates between 4 and 6 percent. It rises through much 
of the 1800s, reaches its peak in the 1930s, and declines fairly steadily thereafter, except for a brief upward 
spike in the early 1970s. The sharpest decline in the premium occurs in the 1990s. The later inference is 
influenced by the prior belief that the premium and the price tend to change in opposite directions. When 
that aspect of the model is omitted, the estimated premium instead increases during the last decade.”  
Fama and French (2002) estimate the market risk premium for the period 1951-2000 
as being between 2.55% and 4.32%. They say that these figures are far below the stock return 
over the risk-free rate (7.43%) because the reduction in the market risk premium has caused 
an unexpected increase in share prices. In the period 1872-1950, they estimate a market risk 
premium between 4.17% and 4.4%. They claim that the high average return for 1951-2000 is 
due to a decline in discount rates that produces large unexpected capital gains. They conclude 
that the stock return of the last half-century was a lot higher than expected. 
Arnott and Ryan (2001) claim that the expected market risk premium is negative. 
They base this conclusion on the low dividend yield and their low expectation of dividend 
growth. Arnott and Bernstein (2002) also conclude that the expected market risk premium is 
negative or zero.  8 
Li and Xu (2002) show that “survival bias”
9 fails to explain the “equity premium 
puzzle”
10. 
Although they have no scientific value, we can also see what market premium has been used in 
finance classes by MBA students in the United States and Europe: in 2000, most professors were using 
figures between 5% and 7%, although it is true to say that this was to resolve cases covering the previous 
20 years. However, if professors were asked what they thought was the market premium, the responses at 
the end of 1999 ranged from 2% to 5%. One example: Robert Merton, Nobel laureate in economics in 1997 
and professor of finance at Harvard, replied to the author of this note that the market premium in the U.S. 
was in the region of 2% in 1999. In Spain, over the period 1999-2004, investment analysts used required 
market risk premiums ranging from 3% to 4.5%, whereas in previous years they had used slightly higher 
premiums.  
 
Authors  Conclusion about market risk premium 
Ibbotson and Chen (2003)  5.9% arithmetically, 3.97% geometrically 
Brealey and Myers (1996)  8.2 - 8.5% 
Brealey and Myers (2000)  6 - 8.5% 
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1995)  5 - 6% 
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000)  4.5 - 5% 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1993)   8.5% 
Van Horne (1992)   3 - 7% 
Weston, Chung and Siu (1997)  7.5% 
Bodie and Merton (2000)   8% 
Damodaran (1994)  5.5% 
Damodaran (2001)  4% 
Mayfield (2004)   5.9% 
Claus and Thomas (2001)   3 -4% 
Harris and Marston (1999)   7.14% 
Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003)   5% arithmetically, 3% geometrically 
Jagannathan, McGrattan and Shcherbina (2001)   7% during 1926-70. 0.7% after that. 
Welch (2000)   7% arithmetically, 5.2% geometrically 
Welch (2001)   5.5% arithmetically, 4.7% geometrically 
Pensions and Investments (1998)   3% 
Greenwich Associates Survey (1997)  5% 
Fama and French (2002)   2.55 - 4.32% in 1951-2000.  4.17 - 4.4% in 1951-2000 
 
 
2. Evolution of the stock market and inflation in Spain 
Figure 1 compares the evolution since 1940 of two indexes of the Spanish Stock 
Exchange –the ITBM (which includes dividends) and the IGBM (which does not include 
dividends) – with the evolution of cumulative inflation. The ITBM provides the total return 
of a diversified stock portfolio (the IGBM does not take into account any dividends received 
by shareholders). An investment of 100 euros in shares in 1940 had by 2003 (disregarding 
                                                            
9 “Survival bias” refers to the fact that databases contain data on companies listed today (they tend not to have 
data on companies that went bankrupt or filed for bankruptcy protection in the past), and so any calculations of 
historical returns based on these data yield returns slightly higher than would be the case if the companies that 
disappeared were taken into account. 
10 The “equity premium puzzle” refers to the much bigger historical returns of equities compared to those of 
fixed income securities, which still are not well explained by economic models. 9 
taxes) turned into 157,474 euros. The inflation path indicates that, on the average, a good that 
cost 100 euros in 1940 cost 12,905 euros in 2003. The average annual return between 1940 
and 2003 was 12.4% and average inflation was 8.0%. 











Figure 2 shows the annual return of the ITBM from 1940. The best year was 1986: 
the return on shares was above 100%. The return in recent years was: 19.7% in 1999, -10.4% 
in 2000, -3.6% in 2001, -20.5% in 2002 and 33% in 2003. The worst years were 1948 (-
28%), 1977 (-28%), 1976 (-26%) and 1990 (-23%). The average arithmetic return of these 63 
years was 15%. The average geometric
11 return
12 was 12.4%. The annual return was negative 
in 19 of the 63 years. 










                                                            
11 The geometric average is lower than the arithmetic average. Consider the case where the stock market yields 
100% one year and -50% the next. The arithmetic average would say that the average annual market return in 
those two years was 25%. But an investor who began with $100 would have had $200 at the end of year 1 and 
$100 at the end of year 2. The geometric average would tell us that the average annual market return in those 
two years was 0%, which is a more accurate reflection of reality 
12 The average geometric return is calculated as follows: 12.4% = (157,474 / 100)
1/63 - 1. 
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3. Historical market risk premium in Spain 
Figure 3 shows the average (10 and 20-year) historical market risk premium of 
equities over government bonds (calculated as the geometric average of the difference 
between the annual return of equities and the return of government bonds). Note that this 
quantity is highly unstable over time, and that for extended periods it was actually negative. 
A negative required market risk premium makes no economic sense. 
Figure 3. Spain. Historical market risk premium 
(Geometric average of the difference between the annual return of the ITBM (includes dividends) and the 











Table 2 shows average annual returns of the stock market and of government bonds, and 
the historical market risk premium in different periods
13. For each parameter, the arithmetic 
average and the geometric average have been calculated
14. 
Table 2. Spain. Average annual returns of the stock market and of government bonds, and historical 
market risk premium  
  Return on equities  Return on gov. bonds 
Historical market risk 
premium over gov. bonds 
  Arithmetic Geometric  Arithmetic  Geometric Arithmetic Geometric 
  average average  average  average average average 
1963-2003 15.7%  12.6%  9.8%  9.7%  5.9%  2.9% 
1963-1970 14.1%  12.6%  6.8%  6.8%  7.4%  5.8% 
1971-1980 1.8%  -0.1%  11.4%  11.4%  -9.6%  -11.5% 
1981-1990 29.5%  24.8%  13.8%  13.8%  15.7%  11.0% 
1991-2003 16.6%  14.0%  7.3%  7.2%  9.3%  6.8% 
1981-2003 22.2%  18.6%  10.1%  10.0%  12.1%  8.6% 
1971-2003 16.0%  12.6%  10.5%  10.4%  5.5%  2.2% 
                                                            
13 In an article published in the June 1997 issue of the Madrid Stock Exchange newsletter, it was said that “a 
coherent value for the risk premium of equities over bonds in Spain would be 6.3% between 1980 and 1997”. 
That 6.3% was the arithmetic average of the difference between the annual return of the ITBM and the annual 
return of government bonds 
14 On the question of whether it is better to use the arithmetic average or the geometric average, Indro and Lee 
(1997) provide a good summary. These authors affirm that the arithmetic average overestimates the differential 
































Geometric average differential return 20 years
Geometric average differential return 10 years11 
Differences between the arithmetic average and the geometric average 
 
There are four properties that differentiate the arithmetic average from the geometric average:  
1.  The geometric average is always equal to or smaller than the arithmetic average. 
2.  The more variable (volatile) the returns, the greater the difference between the arithmetic average and 
the geometric average. 
3.  The geometric average depends only on the price level at the beginning and end of the period studied. 
The arithmetic average, however, tends to rise as the period used shortens. For example, the arithmetic 
average calculated using monthly returns is usually greater than the arithmetic average obtained using 
annual returns. 
4.  The difference between the geometric averages of two series is not equal to the geometric average of 
the difference. However, the arithmetic average of the difference between two series is equal to the 
difference between the arithmetic averages of the two series. 
 
Table 3 shows the volatility of the stock market (the return of the ITBM), 
government bonds and inflation in the same periods. 
 
Table 3. Spain. Annual volatility of the ITBM (stocks), government bonds and inflation 
 
 
Stocks Bonds  Inflation 
1963-2003 28.0%  3.8%  5.7% 
1963-1970 21.2%  1.5%  3.5% 
1971-1980 20.7%  2.3%  5.2% 
1981-1990 38.2%  2.5%  3.5% 
1991-2003 24.8%  3.1%  1.3% 
 
 
4. Historical differential return of the market portfolio and the risk-free rate in the U.S. 




Figure 4 shows the annual returns of the market (stocks), the 3-month risk-free rate 








Figure 4. Annual return of the U.S. stock market (shares), 3-month Government bonds (T-bills) and 























Figure 5 shows the annual volatility, calculated using data from the previous 10 
years, of stocks, inflation, long-term bonds, and short-term Treasury bills.  The volatility of 
long-term bonds (T-Bonds) has been significant, particularly at the end of the ’80s, when it 
was greater than that of stocks. The volatility of short-term bonds (T-Bills) has been 
markedly less and remained until 1981 below the volatility of inflation.   
 
Figure 5. Annual volatility of the S&P 500 (stocks), 3-month U.S. treasury bills (T-bills), 30-year U.S. 










Figure 6 shows the volatility of the S&P 500 Index using monthly data. We can see 
that the volatility of the S&P 500 in the later years has not been greater, on the average, than 
the volatility of previous periods. 







































T-Bonds  Inflation13 
Figure 6. Annual volatility of the U.S. stock market (S&P 500 stocks). Volatility calculated using 











5. Return of stocks over bonds in USA 
5.1. The period 1926-1999 
Figure 7 shows the geometric average for the previous 20 years of the annual 
difference between the annual return of the market and the 3-month risk-free rate (T-Bills) 
and the 30-year risk-free rate (T-Bonds) between 1948 and 2003. 
 
Figure 7. Historical differential return (geometric average) between the market and T-bills and  










Figure 8 shows the arithmetic average for the previous 10 years of the annual 
difference between the annual return of the market and the 3-month risk-free rate between 
1938 and 2003 and compares it with the short-term interest rate in each year. Note that the 
premium was greatest in the years with the lowest interest rates. It can also be seen that when 
rates rise, the premium falls, and vice-versa. This is logical: in general, share prices rise when 














































1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Average differential return (20 years) over the T-Bills
Average differential return (20 years) over the T-Bonds
T- Bills 
T-Bonds 14 
Figure 8. Historical differential return over the previous 10 years, and annual return of the 3-month 









Table 4 shows the average market return, the average short-term risk-free rate, and 
the average long-term risk-free rate in different periods. Both the arithmetic and the 
geometric average have been calculated for all parameters. 
 
Table 4. U.S. stock market. Average (arithmetic and geometric) in different periods of the annual return 
of the market, the 3-month risk-free rate (T-bills) and the 30-year risk-free rate (T-bonds) 
  Average return Shares  Average return T-Bills  Average return T-Bonds 
  Arithmetic Geometric Arithmetic  Geometric  Arithmetic Geometric 
1926-2003 12.4%  10.6%  3.8%  3.8%  5.2%  5.0% 
1951-2003 13.1%  11.7%  5.1%  5.1%  5.7%  5.3% 
1961-2003 12.1%  10.8%  5.8%  5.8%  6.7%  6.3% 
1971-2003 13.0%  11.5%  6.3%  6.3%  8.3%  7.9% 
1981-2003 14.1%  12.9%  6.1%  6.1%  10.1%  9.6% 




Table 5. U.S. stock market. Average (average and geometric) in different periods of the market premium 
over the 3-month risk-free rate (T- Bills) and the 30-year risk-free rate (T- Bonds) 
 
Historical market risk 
premium over T-Bills 
Historical market risk 
premium over T-Bonds 
  Arithmetic Geometric Arithmetic Geometric 
1926-2003 8.6%  6.8%  7.2%  5.6% 
1951-2003 8.0%  6.7%  7.4%  6.4% 
1961-2003 6.2%  4.9%  5.4%  4.5% 
1971-2003 6.7%  5.3%  4.7%  3.7% 
1981-2003 8.0%  6.9%  4.0%  3.3% 
1991-2003 9.6%  8.0%  7.1%  5.6% 
1991-1999 16.5%  16.0%  15.4%  15.0% 
 
Table 5 shows the average differential return between the market and the short-term 
risk-free rate (T-Bills), and the average differential return between the market and the long-
term risk-free rate (T-Bonds) in different time periods. Arithmetic averages and geometric 







1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Historical differential return (10 years) over T-Bills
T-Bills15 
Figure 9 shows the geometric average annual difference between the annual market 
return and 3-month government securities (T-Bills), and the annual difference between the 
market return and the return of long-term government securities (T-Bonds) for all the years to 
2003. Figure 10 shows the same information, but calculating the historical market risk 
premium from 1926 to the chosen year.  
 
Figure 9. U.S. stock market. Annual (geometric) average of the historical market risk premium of 
stocks versus 3-month government securities (T-Bills), 30-year government securities (T-Bonds) and 






















Figure 10. U.S. stock market. Annual average historical market risk premium of stocks versus 3-
month government securities (T-Bills), 30-year government securities (T-Bonds) and inflation, 












5.2. Period 1802-1925 
Schwert (1990) and Siegel (1998) studied the relationship between U.S. equity and 
bonds before 1926. The data on which they base their studies are less reliable than recent 
data, but the results are interesting, nevertheless. Table 6 shows their conclusions. It can be 
seen that the historical risk premium in the period 1802-1925 was substantially less than the 
historical risk premium in subsequent years.  Likewise, it can be seen that inflation was 
substantially less before 1926. However, the real return of bonds was significantly higher in 























One conclusion that can be drawn after studying all these periods is that the risk 
premium has varied so much in the past that it is almost impossible to say what its average 
has been and, of course, much more complicated to predict the future from historical data. 
 
Table 6. US stock market. Average (arithmetic) return in different periods of the equity premium 
versus 3-month bills (premium bills) and 30-year bonds (premium bonds) 
 
  Average arithmetic return   
Historical market risk premium 
(arithmetic) 
  Shares T-Bills  T-Bonds  Inflation  T-Bills  T-Bonds 
1802-1870 8.1%  5.1%  4.9%  0.1%  3.0%  3.2% 
1871-1925 8.4%  3.2%  4.4%  0.6%  5.2%  4.0% 
1926-2003 12.4%  3.8%  5.2%  3.2%  8.6%  7.2% 
1802-2003 9.9%  4.1%  4.9%  1.4%  5.8%  5.0% 
 
A more detailed look at the data given here raises the following points: 
1.  The historical equity premium varies so much that it is impossible to use historical 
data to asses the magnitude of the required market risk premium. 
 
2.  The required risk premium has varied over time. 
 
3.  In the period 1926-2003, the North American financial markets suffered from 
financial crises, but the North American economy was not exposed to other types of 
vicissitude that affected other countries, such as a war fought on its own territory.  
 
4.  Inflation changed considerably in the years that followed the gold standard. With the 
abandonment of the gold standard, unexpected inflation became a much more 
important risk. 
 
6. Comparison of the Spanish and U.S. stock markets 
6.1. Evolution of stock market indices 
 






















1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
ITBM S&P 500 T-Bonds. USA17 
Figure 11 compares the evolution of the ITBM from 1940 with that of the U.S. stock 
market
15. The correlation between the annual returns of the Spanish stock market and of the 
U.S. stock market between 1941 and 2003 was only 18.7%
16. 
Figure 12 shows the annual return of the U.S. market and the Spanish market since 
1940. 
 


























Figure 13. Correlation between the Spanish and U.S. stock markets 



















                                                            
15 An investment of 100 euros in Spanish shares in 1940 became (excluding taxes) 157,474 euros in 2000. An 
investment of 100 dollars in U.S. stocks in 1940 became (excluding taxes) 125,655 dollars in 2003. 
An investment of 100 dollars in U.S. T-Bonds in 1940 became (excluding taxes) 2,017 dollars in 2003. 
16 The correlation has increased significantly over the years: 
 
Correlation of the annual returns of the Spanish and U.S. markets 
1940-2003  1940-1960 1961-1980 1981-2003 1991-2003 














































6.2. Correlation between the two countries’ stock markets 
Figure 13 shows how the correlation between the returns of the Spanish and U.S. 
markets has gradually increased. From a negative correlation in the 1950s and through much 
of the 1960s and 1970s, recent years have seen a very high correlation. 
UBS (2004) also points out that the correlations between the stocks and bonds of 
different countries have increased considerably, particularly since March 2000. It also points 
out that the correlations (between March 2000 and December 2003) between the S&P 500 
and the DAX, and between the S&P 500 and the FTSE, were 0.97. The correlation between 
the S&P 500 and Topix was 0.94. The correlations between the yields of 10-year government 
bonds also were high: 0.93 between USA and Germany; 0.85 between USA and Japan; and 
0.91 between USA and UK. 
 
6.3. The effect of inflation in the U.S. and Spain 
To be able to compare the evolution of the Spanish and U.S. markets, Figures 11 and 
12 are not enough; we also need to take into account the effect of inflation in both countries. 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of annual inflation in both countries. In practically every year 
inflation was higher in Spain than in the U.S. Figure 15 shows the inflation path, that is, how 
much goods that cost 100 (dollars or euros, depending on the country) in 1940 cost in each 
subsequent year. It can be seen that, in Spain, goods that cost 100 in 1940 cost 12,095 in 
2003 (77.6 euros), whereas in the United States, goods that cost 100 in 1940 cost 1,320 
in 2003. Average inflation was 8% in Spain and 4.2% in the U.S.  










































































Figure 16. Evolution of the inflation-adjusted ITBM and the inflation-adjusted S&P 500 (U.S. stocks) 



















Figure 16 incorporates inflation in the evolution of the U.S. and Spanish indices. 
Thus, the deflated index of the U.S. market goes from 100 in 1940 to 9,519 in 2003, while 
the deflated index of the Spanish market goes from 100 to 1,220 in 2003. The Figure also 
shows that the index of long-term U.S. government bonds was below 100 for many years and 
rose above 100 from 1992. 
Figure 17 shows the average change in value of the U.S. and Spanish stock markets 
above inflation over the past 10 years. The Spanish stock market has had periods when it has 
risen below inflation; in the early 1950s, around 1960, and in the period between 1974 and 
1983. However, it has also had periods when it has risen much faster than inflation, such as 
the mid-1950s, the early ’70s, the late ’80s and the period starting 1993. 
 
Figure 17. Historical market risk premium of the Spanish and U.S. stock markets versus inflation 










Figure 18 shows the volatility of the Spanish stock market, the U.S. stock market, 
and inflation in Spain and the U.S. All the volatilities have been calculated using 10 years of 
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higher than that of the U.S. stock market. The volatility of inflation in Spain has also been 
higher than the volatility of inflation in the U.S., although they have become more equal in 
recent years. 
Figure 18. Volatility of the stock market and inflation in Spain and USA 











7. Historical market risk premium in different countries  
Table 7 shows the difference between the geometric average of the return of stocks 
and the geometric average of the return of long-term bonds
17 in different countries from 
1970-1996. Note that in Germany and Italy, the difference was negative during that period, 
which is further proof that it is meaningless to call the difference between the historical 
market return and the risk-free rate the “risk premium”. 
It can also be seen that the difference is greater in countries where the equity market 
performed better during the period. 
    
Table 7. Annual geometric average differential return of the stock market versus  
long-term government bonds in several countries 
 
    Average annual return   
Country Period  Stocks  Government  bonds  Difference 
Australia 1970-1996  8.47% 6.99%  1.48% 
Canada 1970-1996  8.98% 8.30%  0.68% 
France 1970-1996  11.51% 9.17%  2.34% 
Germany 1970-1996  11.30% 12.10%  -0.80% 
Hong Kong  1970-1996  20.39% 12.66%  7.73% 
Italy 1970-1996  5.49% 7.84%  -2.35% 
Japan 1970-1996  15.73% 12.69%  3.04% 
Holland 1970-1996  15.48% 10.83%  4.65% 
Switzerland 1970-1996  13.49% 10.11%  3.38% 
UK 1970-1996  12.42% 7.81%  4.61% 
US 1970-1996  12.34% 8.62%  3.72% 
Spain 1970-1996  8.22% 7.91%  0.31% 
 
             Source: Ibbotson. http://www.ibbotson.com 
                                                            
17 Very often, this difference is called the risk premium (meaning required market risk premium), although, as 






























Inflation Spain Inflation USA21 
Table 7 serves a purely informative purpose: it cannot be used to determine each 
market’s risk premium. It makes no sense to say that the risk premium (understood as the 
incremental return above the risk-free rate required to equity) in Spain during the period 
1970-1996 was 0.31%, while in Holland it was 4.65% and 3.72% in the United States. 
 
8.   Premium of the North American stock market  from  the  Gordon  and  Shapiro      
equation 
One can also attempt to calculate the implicit market premium from the Gordon and 
Shapiro equation.  The Gordon and Shapiro equation simply says that the price of shares is 
the current value of the expected dividends discounted at the required return to equity (Ke):  
 
P = present value [Dividends ;  Ke] 
  However, in turn, Ke is equal to the risk-free rate plus the market risk premium.  
Ke = RF + Required market risk premium 
 
To calculate the market risk premium, when stock prices are known, all that we need 
to know are the expected dividends.  Damodaran (2001) performs this exercise using the 
expected dividends, obtained from analysts’ forecasts. For the next 5 years after the year in 
which the calculation is performed, he uses analysts’ estimates.  There are data obtained from 
analysts’ estimates only after 1985. Before that date, he takes the dividends that were actually 
paid. After year 6, he assumes that dividends will grow at the same rate as long-term 
Treasury bonds.  
 
Figure 19. Implied required market risk premium of the S&P 500 using the two-stage growth model.  








Sources: Damodaran (2001, page 65) and own data. 
 
Damodaran (2001, page 67) concludes,  
 “The average implied equity-risk premium between 1970 and 2000 is approximately 4%. By 
using this premium, you are assuming that while markets might have been overvalued in some of these years 
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Throughout his book, Damodaran (2001) uses a market risk premium of 4% for the 
U.S. 
Figure 19 shows a growth in the market risk premium during the 1972 oil shock and 
a subsequent fall in the rate, until it reached about 1.5% in 1998. The important point about 
this figure is not so much the specific parameter as that the market risk premium decreases 
from the ’80s onwards
18. 
Glassman and Hassett (2000) calculated in their book Dow 36,000 that the required 
market risk premium in the U.S. in 1999 was 3%
19. Claus and Thomas (1999) reached the 
same conclusion. Jeremy Siegel, a professor at Wharton and author of the book Stocks for the 
Long Run, affirmed:  
 “Although it may seem that stocks are riskier than long-term government bonds, that is not true. 
The safest investment in the long run (from the point of view of preserving the investor’s purchasing power) 
has been stocks, not Treasury bonds”.  
This fact is the fundamental reason why analysts and investors use a market risk 
premium lower than the historical market return on bonds. The decline of the market 
premium also explains, at least in part, why the stock markets were so profitable during the 
1990s. 
 
9. Recent comparison of stock market trends in Spain, Germany, Japan and USA 
Figure 20 compares long-term interest rates (interest rate paid on 10-year bonds) in 
Spain, Germany, Japan and USA.  It can be seen that, until 1996, the interest rate paid on 
bonds in Spain was substantially higher than in the other countries. After that date, however, 
long-term interest rates in Spain, USA and Germany converge until they reach the present 
level of about 5.5%.  Although Japan has followed the same trend as the other countries 
(interest rates fell from December 1991 onwards), it has always had lower interest rates than 
Spain, Germany and USA. 
 











                                                            
18  A number of factors suggested as possible causes of the decline in the market risk premium are: computer 
and Internet access to the stock market, the decrease in transaction costs, more favorable tax treatment, financial 
deregulation, the development of mutual and pension funds, the entry of the baby boom generation into the 
saving phase, and the observation by investors that, in the long run, stocks have almost always given a higher 
return than bonds. 















Figure 21 shows the trend of four countries’ stock market indexes.  The starting 
point for all indexes is 100 points in December 1991. It can be seen that the IBEX 35, the 
S&P 500, and the DAX 30 have followed parallel paths: all of them have increased 
significantly. The behavior of the Japanese Nikkei 225 index has been completely different: 
not only has it not increased but its value in 2001 was less than in December 1991. 
 
Figure 21. Trend of the stock market indexes of Spain, Germany, Japan and United States 



















Table 8 shows the correlation matrix between the increase in interest rates in the 
different countries and the returns of the market indexes.  The correlations between the U.S., 
German and Spanish stock market indexes have been greater than the correlations between 
these three indexes and that of the Japanese market.  Also, the correlation between the 
indexes’ returns and the increase in interest rates has been greater (in absolute terms) in Spain 
(-33.3%) than in the other countries (7.3%. 25.7% and 0.4%).  The correlation between 
interest rate increases has naturally been greater between Spain and Germany than between 
Spain and the United States.  There has also been a strong correlation between interest rate 
increases in Germany and the United States. The correlation between interest rate increases in 
Spain and Japan was virtually zero. 
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix. Monthly data, 1991-2003 
 
   Return of the  Increase of the risk-free rate in 
   IBEX DAX NIKKEI  S&P 500  Spain  Germany  Japan  USA 
Return IBEX (Spain)  100.0%  74.8%  37.1%  63.8%        
Return DAX (Germany)  74.8%  100.0%  31.4%  71.1%        
Return NIKKEI (Japan)  37.1%  31.4%  100.0%  38.5%        
Return S&P (USA)  63.8%  71.1%  38.5%  100.0%        
∆ risk-free rate Spain  -33.3%  -13.3%  -2.6%  -10.4%  100.0%  59.8%  4.9%  35.4% 
∆ risk-free rate Germany  3.4%  7.3%  5.3%  2.7%  59.8%  100.0%  25.1%  60.4% 
∆ risk-free rate Japan  15.4%  4.1%  25.7%  3.5%  4.9%  25.1%  100.0%  18.8% 
∆ risk-free rate USA  15.7%  24.8%  6.4%  0.4%  35.4%  60.4%  18.8%  100.0% 
 
Figure 21, like many of the previous figures, shows that market prices rose 
dramatically during the 1990s, except for the Japanese market, only to fall in 2000, 2001 and 
















USA (S&P 500)24 
one, that the required market risk premium had declined, and two, that stocks were 
overvalued
20.   
 
10. Does the required market risk premium exist? 
One of the hypotheses on which the CAPM –and most financial models– is based is 
that of homogenous expectations: all investors have the same return and risk expectations
21 
for all assets. If that were the case, all investors would have portfolios composed of risk-free 
debt and an equity portfolio with the same percentage composition as the market (the stock 
market). However, it is obvious that not all investors have the same expectations, that not all 
investors have equity portfolios with an identical composition, and that not all investors have 
a portfolio composed of all the stocks traded on the market
22. 
We can find out an investor’s market risk premium by asking him, although for 
many investors the market risk premium is often not an explicit parameter but, rather, an 
implicit one that manifests in the price they are prepared to pay for shares
23. However, it is 
impossible to determine the premium for the market as a whole, because it does not exist. 
Even if we knew the market premiums of all the investors who operated on the market, it 
would be meaningless to talk of a premium for the market as a whole.  
The rationale for this is to be found in the aggregation theorems of microeconomics, 
which in actual fact are non-aggregation theorems. One model that works well individually 
for a number of people may not work for all of the people together
24. For the CAPM, this 
means that although the CAPM may be a valid model for each investor, it is not valid for the 
market as a whole, because investors do not have the same return and risk expectations for all 
shares. Prices are a statement of expected cash flows discounted at a rate that includes the 
risk premium. Different investors have different cash flow expectations and different future 
risk expectations. One could only talk of a market risk premium if all investors had the same 
cash flow expectations. 
Figure 22 is proof that investors do not have the same expectations: it presents the 
result of a survey performed among IESE MBAs in January 1998 regarding their return and 
risk (volatility) forecasts for the Spanish stock market in 1998. It is plain to see that 
individual expectations vary enormously. The return of the IBEX 35 in 1998 was 36% and 
the volatility was 38%. 
 
 
                                                            
20 When talking of market overvaluation, people often talk about the existence of a speculative bubble, which 
means that when this bubble bursts, the stock market will fall to correct price levels (according to those who 
believe that the market is overvalued). One example: Greenspan, president of the US Federal Reserve, said on 
December 5, 1996 (when the Dow Jones was at 6,437 points) that the stock market was showing “irrational 
exuberance”. In August 1999, when the Dow Jones was at 11,090 points, he said that, in his opinion, the stock 
market was under the effects of a speculative bubble. 
21 Identical risk expectations is when all investors agree on their expectations regarding the future volatility of 
each share’s return and the correlation between the shares’ returns. 
22 For a good article on the non-existence of homogenous expectations, see Levy & Levy (1996). 
23 An example: An investor is prepared to pay 100 euros today for a perpetual annual cash flow of 6 euros 
guaranteed by the State (risk-free fixed-income securities). This implies that the risk-free rate is 6%. However, 
for another perpetual annual cash flow of 6 euros in year 1 and growing at an annual rate of 3%, which he 
expects to obtain from a diversified equity portfolio, he is only prepared to pay 80 euros. This means that the 
required market return is 10.5% ([6/80] + 0.03). Consequently, this investor’s market premium is 4.5%. 
24 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say, “it is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by 
a representative consumer, this representative consumer’s preferences have normative contents. It may even be 
the case that a positive representative consumer exists but that there is no social welfare function that leads to a 
normative representative consumer.” 25 
Figure 22. Return and risk (volatility) expectations for the Spanish stock market in 1998.  










Table 9 shows the forecasts made at the end of 1997 by a number of analysts about 
the level of the Dow Jones at the end of 1998. It also shows their recommendations for the 
composition of a portfolio: %S is the proportion of stocks that they recommended (the 
difference in fixed income). Note the scatter of the forecasts (between 6,100 and 10,250), and 
the scatter of the proportion of stocks in the portfolio. One would expect that those who 
forecast a larger rise in the Dow Jones Index would recommend a higher proportion of 
stocks, but, as can be seen, this is not always so. The Dow Jones stood at 7,908 points on 31 
December 1997 and 9,181 points on 30 December 1998.  
 
Table 9. Forecasts made at the end of 1997 by analysts about the level of the Dow Jones at the end of 1998 
 
  Dow 
Jones 
    Dow 
Jones 
 
Analyst/Company 1998  %S  Analyst/Company 1998  %S 
BIRINY JR. Birinyi Assoc.  10,250  75  E. CRIPPS Legg Mason Wood Walker  8,600  80 
J. FROEHLICH Zurich Kemper Invest.  10,000  75  J. PRADILLA Cowen & Co.  8,600  45 
E. PERONI JR. Janney Montgomery Scott  9,850  100  F. SKRAINKA Edward Jones  8,600  70 
F. DWYER Ladenburg Thalmann & Co.  9,800  65  T. MADDEN Federated Investors  8,500  55 
S. ROBBINS Robinson-Humphrey  9,455  60  A. SMITH Prudential Securities  8,500  85 
J. APPLEGATE  Lehman Brothers  9,200  75  J. MACKAY Bear Stearns  8,350  50 
J. CANELO Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter  9,000  70  P. ANDERSON American Express Fin.Adv.  8,100  70 
J. DOMBICIK McDonald & Co.  9,000  75  M. ACUFF Salomon Smith Barney  8,000  55 
G. RILEY JR BankBoston  8,950  60  G. CRANE Key Asset Management  7,800  75 
S. RONESS JW Charles  8,900  85  G. JACOBSEN Trevor Stewart Burton&J.  7,750  60 
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A. GOLDMAN  A.G. Edwards & Sons  8,800  70  R. BROWN Feris, Baker Watts  7,061  40 
M. SIMPSON  Kirkpatrick Pettis  8,800  70  H. BARTHEL Fahnestock  7,000  60 
W. ZEMPEL Robert W. Baird & Co.  8,740  70  M. DION  Ziegler Asset Management  7,000  95 
J. COHEN Goldman Sach  8,700  65  M. METZ Cibc-Oppenheimer  7,000  25 
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The required market risk premium is one thing; the historical return of stocks over the 
risk-free rate is quite another. It is a common error to confuse them. 
  The problem with the market risk premium is that investors do not have homogenous expectations. If 
they did, it would make sense to talk of a market risk premium because all investors would have the market 
portfolio. However, expectations are not homogenous. 
 
11. The HMDYWD method 
My friend Guillermo Fraile, professor at IAE in Buenos Aires, jokes in his classes 
about a new method for calculating the risk premium for family businesses: the HMDYWD 
(an abbreviation for How much do you want, Dad?) method. After what we have seen in this 
chapter, the HMDYWD method is no joke: it does not make much sense to talk about the 
market risk premium as a magnitude shared by all investors; but it does make sense to talk 
about each investor’s market risk premium, including Dad’s. 
 
12. Conclusion 
The market risk premium (MRP) is one of the most important but elusive parameters 
in finance. It is also called equity premium, market premium and risk premium. The term 
MRP is used to designate three different concepts (although many times they are mixed): 
1.  Required MRP. It is the incremental return of a diversified portfolio (the market) 
over the risk-free rate (return of treasury bonds) required by an investor. It is needed 
for calculating the required return to equity (cost of equity).  
 
2.  Historical MRP. It is the historical differential return of the stock market over 
treasury bonds.  
 
3.  Expected MRP. It is the expected differential return of the stock market over treasury 
bonds.  
 
Many authors and finance practitioners assume that expected MRP is equal to the 
historical MRP and to the required MRP. The CAPM assumes that the required MRP is 
equal to the expected MRP. 
The historical MRP is equal for all investors, but the required and the expected 
MRP are different for different investors. The expected MRP (an expectation) is one 
parameter; the historical differential return of stocks over treasury bonds (historical MRP) is 
another. It is a common mistake to think that they are equal. 
We also claim that there is no required MRP for the market as a whole: different 
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